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Ecological cognition: Expert decision-making and action expression in sport 1 
 2 
Abstract 3 
Expert decision-making can be directly assessed, if sport action is understood as 4 
an expression of embedded and embodied cognition. Here, we discuss evidence for this 5 
claim, starting with a critical review of research literature on the perceptual-cognitive 6 
basis for expertise.  In reviewing how performance and underlying processes are 7 
conceived and captured in extant sport psychology, we evaluate arguments in favour of 8 
a key role for actions in decision-making, situated in a performance environment.  Key 9 
assumptions of an ecological dynamics perspective are also presented, highlighting how 10 
behaviours emerge from the continuous interactions in the performer-environment 11 
system. Perception is of affordances; and action, as an expression of cognition, is the 12 
realization of an affordance and emerges under constraints. We also discuss the role of 13 
knowledge and consciousness in decision-making behaviour. Finally, we elaborate on 14 
the specificities of investigating and understanding decision-making in sport from this 15 
perspective. Specifically, decision-making concerns the choice of action modes when 16 
perceiving an affordance during a course of action, as well as the selection of a 17 
particular affordance, amongst many  that exist in a landscape in a sport performance 18 
environment. We conclude by pointing to some applications for the practice of sport 19 
psychology and coaching and identifying avenues for future research.   20 
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Introduction 26 
How expert athletes decide to do what they do is a topic that has interested 27 
scientists for several decades (e.g., Beise & Peasley, 1937), and particularly sport 28 
psychologists(e.g., Straub & Williams, 1984). It has been argued that sport is a most 29 
appropriate context for studying expert decision-making (Gilovitch, 1984, Gilovitch et al, 30 
1985). According to Gobet (2016), sport is a domain of expertise, where expertise relies 31 
on perception: “experts literally ‘see’ things differently compared to novices” and “these 32 
differences in perception and knowledge affect problem solving and decision making” 33 
(Gobet, 2016, p.7). 34 
Predicated on these ideas, studies of decision-making in sport have intensively 35 
tested athletes'perception and anticipation, attention, memory, and decision-making. 36 
An important gap emerges immediately: decision-making in sport, by following  trends 37 
in cognitive psychology, has neglected the important role of action and its constitutive 38 
role in cognition (Araújo, Ripoll & Raab, 2009; Prinz, Beisert & Herwig, 2013; Wolpert & 39 
Landy, 2012). In this article, we critically overview research on the perceptual-cognitive 40 
basis of decision-making, before we present an action-based alternative, from the 41 
ecological dynamics framework, clarifying repercussions for theory and research in 42 
sport psychology. 43 
 44 
The perceptual-cognitive framework for the study of decision-making in sport 45 
Currently,  the perceptual-cognitive view of decision-making tends to focus on 46 
use of perception, memory and decision-making tasks to capture performance and to 47 
identify mediating mechanisms (Williams & Abernethy, 2012; for previous reviews see 48 
Bar-Eli, Plessner & Raab, 2011; Cotterill & Discombe, 2016; Hodges, Huys & Starkes, 49 
2007; Raab & Helsen, 2015; Tenenbaum & Gershgoren, 2014; Williams & Ward, 2007). 50 
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 51 
Paradigms for capturing perceptual-cognitive performance 52 
Research in sport has purported to reveal experts’ ability to use “advance cues” 53 
for anticipatory responses, or to anticipate outcomes of an immediate opponent’s action, 54 
often before an action is completed (e.g., Abernethy et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2002). 55 
Early research showed that expert players are better than novices at detecting 56 
deceptive moves by an opponent (e.g., Jackson et al., 2006). Also, in comparison with 57 
novices, experts display visual search strategies that tend to fixate on movements of an 58 
opponent’s body segments that are more remote from an end effector when completing 59 
an action such as hitting a ball (e.g., Abernethy & Russell, 1987). Research 60 
methodologies employed allowed participants to observe, and respond to short ‘sport-61 
specific courses of action', captured in a series of video-clips (also in films, static images 62 
and point-light displays). The clips are edited to present an entire course of action, 63 
testing: (i) rapidity and accuracy in controlled response conditions (e.g., response time 64 
paradigm), or (ii), relative importance of spatial and temporal variables in decision-65 
making by occluding specific information sources (spatial occlusion paradigm), or 66 
varying durations of each clip (temporal occlusion paradigm). Traditional explanations 67 
for these findings were similar to original proposals of de Groot (1965) studying chess 68 
players: perception in experts is better developed because they can access more refined 69 
internal representations as knowledge structures (e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  70 
Recognition and recall have been associated with the study of memory, through 71 
identification of sequences of play. Several studies in sport have used  brief 72 
presentations of domain-specific material,  followed by a recall task (e.g., Allard & 73 
Starkes, 1980). In these tasks, a series of slides or video-clips are presented, and 74 
participants have to indicate verbally or on paper, as quickly as accurately as possible, 75 
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which slides or clips were already presented, and which were new (recognition 76 
paradigm, e.g., Smeeton et al., 2004), or to recall players' positions in a display (recall 77 
paradigm, e.g., North et al., 2011). Results showed that experts attain better recall and 78 
recognition performance than non-experts, with structured performance situations, but 79 
not with unstructured situations. These results have been explained with reference to 80 
chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973), and this and other memory-based 81 
representations are assumed to underpin experts’ performance superiority, particularly 82 
with respect to decision-making (Tenenbaum & Gershgoren, 2014, see Kording & 83 
Wolpert, 2006 for a Bayesian formalization).  84 
The influence of the information-processing paradigm on the study of decision-85 
making in sport has promoted what Simon (1956) called 'bounded rationality' 86 
(including related, more contemporary, approaches, e.g., fast and frugal heuristics, 87 
naturalistic decision making): humans are rational within the limits imposed by their 88 
cognitive systems (inferring the capacity to process information). The reasoning behind 89 
the claim that rationality is bounded suggests that understanding decision-making 90 
requires studying both the environment and the decision-maker. Even if a decision-91 
maker meticulously follows normative steps of rationalization, there is still an influence 92 
of environmental constraints to consider.  93 
The fast and frugal heuristics framework  places greater significance on the role 94 
of the environment than the information-processing approach, and is aligned with the 95 
arguments of Simon (1956). It addresses environmental variables that are 96 
representative of those in socio-cultural settings, towards which an experiment is 97 
intended to generalise, as Brunswik (1944; 1956) originally proposed. Fast and frugal 98 
heuristics are strategies for decision-making that do not involve much searching for 99 
information or computation (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). This approach has some 100 
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similarities with the naturalistic decision-making framework (Klein, 1998) that has 101 
investigated decision making of experts under time pressure in their domain of 102 
expertise. A significant conclusion of both frameworks is that experts tend not to 103 
deliberate between options but expediently implement the first satisfactory action. Raab 104 
and colleagues  conducted research within the fast and frugal heuristics framework in 105 
sports contexts (see Raab, 2012 for a review). For example, they (Raab & Johnson 2007; 106 
Johnson & Raab, 2003) used video clips of team sports performance which were 107 
interrupted when a player with the ball faced several possible actions. Participants 108 
choosing better options generated fewer options. Expert players, performing under 109 
time constraints, use the ‘take the first’ heuristic, choosing the first alternative that 110 
emerged and better players tended to select the ‘best’ option. Option generation and 111 
selection were proposed to occur in an athlete's memory, from internalised knowledge 112 
representations of performance (Raab, 2012).  113 
Similar knowledge structures are proposed as an explanation for how athletes 114 
generate different probabilistic expectations on how an event may evolve, such as the 115 
potential success associated with performing a certain action (e.g., a pass or dribble 116 
with a ball), or in predicting next movements of an adversary (e.g., Alain & Proteau, 117 
1980; McRobert et al., 2011). It is assumed that the mind or the brain calculates the 118 
statistical distribution of likely event probabilities, and the level of uncertainty in 119 
sensory feedback (Kording & Wolpert, 2006; Williams & Abernethy, 2012), before 120 
making a decision. 121 
 122 
Paradigms for measuring the mediating mechanisms of decision-making  123 
The prevailing approach assumes that to understand mediating mechanisms 124 
employed by performers to make decisions, measures of behaviours like eye 125 
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movements, verbal reports, as well as imaging of neurophysiological and 126 
neuroanatomical function, should be undertaken (Williams & Abernethy, 2012). 127 
Recently, neuroscientific evidence has been proposed to support theoretical arguments 128 
of cognitive sport psychologists (e.g., Tenenbaum, Hatfield et al., 2009), highlighting 129 
brain activity putatively “underlying" processes of perceptual-cognitive performance 130 
(e.g., Williams & Abernethy, 2012; Yarrow, Brown & Krakauer, 2009). Although using 131 
highly restricted micro-movements (e.g., button-pressing, blinking, pointing), research 132 
related to sport performance has postulated that experts tend to display more 133 
consistent brain behaviours during preparatory periods before initiating movement 134 
(Hatfield & Hillman, 2001). These include: (i)more efficient organization of brain 135 
regions (Milton et al., 2007), or (ii), specific brain areas displaying greater 'activation 136 
levels', (Aglioti et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2011), in experts compared to novices. These 137 
findings have been  interpreted as support for a mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti & 138 
Sinigaglia, 2016), which is proposed to transform internal sensory representations of 139 
the behaviours of other performers into motor representations of an observed 140 
behaviour. Later in this chapter we argue that the prevalent idea of 'brain activity', as 141 
the underlying mechanism of perceptual-cognitive performance, is a fallacy. Brain 142 
activity does not constitute proof of the presence of representations, and it should not 143 
be misconstrued as action or cognition (e.g., as if activity level is indicative of the brain 144 
'deciding for' an individual). 145 
Eye movement recording has also been used to assess how performers visually 146 
search  a displayed image or scene during decision-making (Ripoll et al., 1995; Vickers, 147 
2016; Williams et al., 2004). Expert players tend to exhibit fewer fixations of longer 148 
durations and focus for a longer time on areas of free space that could be exploited or 149 
exposed (e.g., Vaeyens et al., 2007). Again, these findings are explained as revealing the 150 
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underlying neural structure (Vickers, 2016), for example, as explained by mirror neuron 151 
theory (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2016). Additionally, verbal protocols, as described by 152 
Ericsson and Simon (1993), have also been used, either concurrently or retrospectively, 153 
as a way to evaluate thought processes that mediate action (e.g., McPherson & Kernodle, 154 
2007; Kannekens et al. 2009). Regardless of the discrepancies  between 'what we say, 155 
what we do' (Araújo et al., 2010), verbal reports are interpreted as responses to 156 
“situation prototypes”, represented in long-term memory (MacMahon & McPherson, 157 
2009; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). 158 
 159 
Criticisms of representational approaches to decision-making in sports 160 
Previous research on perception, action and cognition has typically been 161 
grounded on theories of memory enrichment through representations (i.e., schemas, 162 
scripts, schematas, programs and the like), which consider stimuli in the environment 163 
to be impoverished for individuals. The role of internalised knowledge structures is to 164 
enhance meaning and richness of stimuli. Stimuli need encoding, and transformation by 165 
internal mechanisms that transform meaningless stimuli into meaningful 166 
representations, in order to interpret the environment and program the body to 167 
implement actions during performance (Kording & Wolpert, 2006).  168 
Alternatively, non-representational approaches (e.g., ecological dynamics, Araújo 169 
et al., 2006; for a discussion among different approaches see Araújo & Bourbousson, 170 
2016) are predicated on the idea that perception and cognition are embedded and 171 
embodied, emphasising the study of the performer-environment relationship as an 172 
appropriate scale of analysis. We elaborate some criticisms of the representational 173 
approach to cognition, where cognition is seen as information processing that  results in 174 
representations in the mind or brain (Rowlands, 2009). In interpreting these criticisms, 175 
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we discuss ecological dynamics as an important action-based, non-representational 176 
approach to cognition. From this perspective, cognition is the on-going, active 177 
maintenance of a robust performer–environment system, achieved by closely 178 
coordinated perception and action (Araújo et al., 2006; Stepp et al., 2011).  179 
 180 
Theoretical criticisms: The world is its best model 181 
The representational approach to human performance considers 182 
representations as containing meanings of symbols (i.e., perceptual encoding of stimuli 183 
in the brain, motor programs decoding intentions from brain, through the nervous 184 
system, to physical apparatus for coordinating actions, e.g., muscles, joints, limbs, 185 
bones)(see Araújo, 2007, Shaw, 2003). Representations are assumed to ‘stand for’ 186 
things in the world and things in the body. However, the mechanisms typically 187 
proposed for associative memory, or generally, knowledge structures are epistemic 188 
mediators. They provide contact with the world for an individual athlete.  189 
Computationally, this process of making contact requires conventional rules of 190 
reference that specify what symbols refer to, as well as rules of common usage that 191 
specify symbol meaning in actual contexts. The conventional connection of symbols to 192 
what they represent necessarily involves establishing common conventions through 193 
perceptual means (Shaw, 2003). Currently,  little, if anything, is known about  how the 194 
vital computational processes of symbolic encoding, decoding, and respective rules, are 195 
biologically implemented. In contrast, the ecological dynamics approach holds that 196 
ambient energy distributions are necessarily specific to the facts of the environment 197 
and of a performer’s actions relative to the environment (Gibson, 1979; Turvey & Shaw, 198 
1995). As Warren (2006, p.361) asked, if perceptual and cognitive states are 199 
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representations, how is it possible for an agent to know what they stand for, without 200 
presuming some other direct access to the world?  201 
In sport, the majority of decision-making studies follow the assumption that 202 
decision-making and perceptual judgements are predicated on internalised knowledge 203 
structures operating as inference engines to deliberate on 'the' best decision, or the 204 
decision that 'best fits' the task. In this process, the same assembly of stimuli is assumed 205 
to be perceived and commonly represented in the mind of every observer of a situation. 206 
These stimuli are viewed  as always constraining similar decisions and actions (the 207 
“correct” decisions made by experts, for example). Thus, it is believed that some people 208 
decide well and other people decide poorly. The problem is that, in open, dynamic 209 
systems there is no “best decision”, since the most functional decision at any moment 210 
may compromise future decisions (Araújo et al., 2006; Davids & Araújo, 2010). During 211 
the act of perceiving, the limbs, ears or eyes of a performer explores  available 212 
information in an environment. Complex, structured energy fields of ambient, patterned 213 
energy (i.e., information), such as light reflected from objects, are an environmental 214 
resource to be sought and exploited by individuals, whocontinuously modulate their 215 
interactions with the world, i.e., exerting their agency (Withagen et al., 2017). 216 
Information is the basis for maintaining contact with the environment because it is 217 
specific to its sources. Thus, various exploratory actions of perceptual systems are 218 
required for perception to occur. For the ecological dynamics approach, meaning in 219 
perception is not derived from any form of mental association, or labelling, but only 220 
from information detected by an observer. Therefore, perceptual learning, for example 221 
due to training and experience, is the process of becoming attuned, i.e., better able to 222 
differentiate more and more kinds of information, increasing the range and economy of 223 
the information detection process (Reed, 1993).  224 
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These arguments suggest that an individual’s regulation of behaviour can be 225 
explained without the postulation of mental representations. Decisions are expressed 226 
by actions (Beer, 2003). Planning an action before acting (denoted as  “strategical” in 227 
sports science) can influence the course of decisions (e.g., where to explore), but 228 
behaviour is always dependent on circumstances (action is not a mechanical outcome, 229 
but it is "tactical", i.e. an intentional exploration for an efficient solution). In this respect, 230 
decision-making is an emergent behaviour (Araújo et al., 2006). As the individual moves 231 
with respect to her/his surroundings, there are opportunities for action (affordances, 232 
Gibson, 1979) that persist, arise, and disappear, even though the surroundings remain 233 
the same. Changes of action can give rise to multiple variations in opportunities for 234 
subsequent actions. To exemplify, in team games, two defenders may face an attacker 235 
with the ball, but the gap between the defenders may vary momentarily, inviting 236 
different actions of the attacker, depending on his/her capacities (e.g., speed of 237 
movement), amongst other things. Perception of affordances (opportunities for action) 238 
is the basis for performers controlling her/his behaviours prospectively, i.e., regulating 239 
future behaviors (Gibson, 1979; Turvey, 1992). An important aspect of expert 240 
performance involves acting in a manner that is consistent with ways that are socio-241 
culturally endorsed (Barab & Plucker, 2002, van Dijk & Rietveld, 2017), such as those 242 
valued in different sports.  Experience in acting in a performance context attunes 243 
performers to perceptual variables that reliably specify the state of the environment 244 
relevant to performance in a specific task (Araújo & Davids, 2011). In this way, athletes 245 
can use the situation as its own best model, actively exploring and scanning it in detail 246 
at specific locations according to particular needs in the moment. This idea was 247 
elegantly described by Rodney Brooks, a prominent scientist in robotics as 'the world as 248 
its best model' (Brooks, 1991). Accordingly, robotics and other areas (e.g., 249 
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computational neuroscience) are actively searching for embodied and embedded 250 
explanations for cognition (including perception and action) (see Clark, 2015) for a 251 
recent review). If social, historical, and possibly other external processes, are to be 252 
taken as integral constraints on skilled action, then traditional notions of expert 253 
performance (which relegate these processes to an individual’s internal environment) 254 
should be re-examined: focusing on contexts and relations channelling expert 255 
performance  256 
 257 
Methodological criticisms: Variables that are beyond immediate observation  258 
How scientific findings from laboratory experiments can provide effective 259 
interventions in society (Ericsson & Williams, 2007) has become a major concern within 260 
sport psychology. A critical issue is that disregard for the need to study functional 261 
behaviours in traditional empirical designs has led to a decoupling of perceptual 262 
processes from actions on relevant external objects and events (Fajen, Riley, & Turvey, 263 
2009; van der Kamp et al., 2008). Neisser (1976) recognised this weakness, in his 264 
seminal treatise on cognitive psychology, arguing that laboratory settings with 265 
contrived and  trivial tasks, rather than everyday situations in life, can lead to the 266 
emergence of artificial decisions and behaviours. Examples abound in sport, perhaps 267 
best exemplified with reference to research methodologies in which film and video 268 
presentations have been used to simulate sport performance contexts. Discrepancies 269 
between these task constraints and performance in sport contexts have long been well-270 
documented (Williams et al., 1999; Williams & Abernethy, 2012). These concerns were 271 
endorsed by a recent meta-analysis (Travassos e al., 2013) which clarified how 272 
expertise effects on decision-making in sport were moderated by ubiquitous response 273 
modes (verbal reports, button pressing, performance of micro-movements) and 274 
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methods of stimuli presentation (slides, images, video presentations, in situ) in research. 275 
Moderating effects on decisions and actions were most obvious when participants were 276 
required to move in highly controlled laboratory conditions, rather than when actually 277 
performing sporting actions under in situ task constraints (Travassos et al., 2013).  278 
For example, evidence has revealed that, when cricketers bat against a bowler, 279 
ball projection machine or a video simulation of a bowler with a projection machine, 280 
significant variations in timing of movement initiation and downswing initiation arise 281 
under the different task constraints (Pinder et al., 2011). Similar findings have emerged 282 
in studies of catching behaviours (Stone et al., 2015). Such findings indicate the 283 
relevance of representing in investigations, the key constraints of performance 284 
environments (see Brunswik, 1956). The representativeness of a particular situation 285 
helps participants to achieve performance goals cyclically, by acting to perceive 286 
information to guide further actions (Araújo & Davids, 2015). There needs to be a clear 287 
correspondence between behaviours in one context (an experiment or a training 288 
session) and behaviours in another context (a performance environment) (for detailed 289 
arguments see Araújo & Davids, 2015). The concept of correspondence is of great 290 
importance in decision-making, because, among other things, it is linked to our ability to 291 
perceive similarities between contexts. Recently, Seifert and colleagues (Seifert et al., 292 
2013, 2016) showed how training on an indoor climbing wall might facilitate climbing 293 
on a frozen waterfall. Correspondence between behaviours in these contexts resulted in 294 
emergence of the use of quadrupedal locomotion, facilitating use of limb extremities 295 
and control of gravitational forces due to the vertical support needed for locomotion.  296 
Performance in sport contexts involves actions, in which perceptual judgements 297 
and decisions are embodied(Araújo et al., 2006; Beer, 2003). Much previous research 298 
has linked perception to verbal responses, eye movements or neuroanatomical parts of 299 
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the body supposed to express variables beyond immediate observation (i.e., decisions, 300 
judgments). However, actions by which cognition is expressed require that information 301 
be available in the patterned ambient energy for behaving with respect to 302 
environmental constraints. In this regard, actions, not their surrogates, are true 303 
cognitive behaviours. 304 
 305 
Hidden reductionism: Expert decision-making is not that which happens in a body 306 
location  307 
Gobet (2016) has proposed that 'the jury is out' with regard to whether 308 
neuroscience has “really taught us anything surprising and critical” (p.184) concerning 309 
expert anticipation and decision-making. Gobet (2016) also suggested that studying the 310 
nervous system at the level of brain regions is the wrong level of analysis for 311 
understanding such processes. To exemplify, the mirror neuron hypothesis (Rizzolatti & 312 
Sinigaglia, 2016) is a theory grounded on representations, located in the CNS, which are 313 
considered to have just the right type of organization needed to produce behaviours 314 
(Churchland & Sejnowski, 1989).  315 
This type of reductionist explanation of decision-making, as an internalised 316 
neurophysiological process, seems to endorse psychological attributes as specific 317 
anatomical substrates, and not as emerging from interactions of the individual-318 
environment system. This is an  organism-centred view of behaviour which misses a 319 
central point: the reciprocity between an organism and environment (Davids & Araújo, 320 
2010).  Such a neurophysiological perspective is predicated on a conceptualisation of  a 321 
CNS that perceives, executes, conceives and constructs an action forthe organism. For 322 
this reason some neuroscientists have argued that sport represents a valuable natural 323 
context which challenges the brain (Walsh, 2014). However, it is the performer, who 324 
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actually perceives and acts during dynamical interactions with sport environments, not 325 
separate parts of his/her body (e.g., components of a nervous system),  (Araújo & Kirlik, 326 
2008).  Athletes act to perceive and perceive to act (Gibson, 1979),  with many more 327 
subsystems engaged in the emergence of behaviours than simply the CNS.  Evidence for 328 
this view is abundant in the literature,  traced back to Dewey (1896) (but see recent 329 
reviews of empirical evidence from Reed, 1982; 1996; Richardson et al., 2008; Seifert et 330 
al., 2016b; Teques et al, in press). Sport experts are active performers engaged in 331 
dynamical transactions with their functionally defined environments. Thus, expert 332 
performance is not possessed by the brain of a performer, but rather it is best captured 333 
as an ongoing, dynamically varying relationship that has emerged (and continues to 334 
emerge) between the constraints imposed by the environment and the capabilities of a 335 
performer (Araújo & Davids, 2011).  336 
 This conceptualisation does not mean that the role of neurophysiological 337 
systems in these continuous interactions should not be considered (Teques et al., in 338 
press). After studying the emergent interactions of environment-athlete systems under 339 
the specific constraints of sport tasks, researchers can investigate what affordances 340 
(opportunities for action) are relevant, how they channel action, what the structure of 341 
such actions are and how the entire process involves the contributions of many 342 
individual sub-systems such as the nervous or the cardiovascular sub-systems. In 343 
ecological analyses of neural processes underlying behavioural regulation (Järvilehto, 344 
1998), a basic principle of nervous system functioning is the self-organisation 345 
tendencies of neuronal assemblies.Neuroanatomical organizations are temporary, only 346 
relatively stable and self-organizing to capture the embeddedness of individuals in their 347 
environments, dependent on what Gibson (1966a, 1966b) called the resonance of a 348 
perceptual system to ecological information.  Gibson proposed that “The brain is a self-349 
 15 
tuning resonator” (Gibson, 1966b, p. 146) and achieving resonance implies that the 350 
perceiver learns to become 'tuned' to specific patterns of ambient energy (e.g., sound 351 
from the steps of an approaching opponent or vision of an approaching ball).  Such 352 
structured information specifies features of a particular substance, surface, object, or 353 
event in relation to a particular individual. Resonance is not something that a brain 354 
achieves in isolation, but involves all the body (sub)systems involved in perceiving and 355 
acting in the environment (Gibson, 1966a). Resonance captures how the brain-body-356 
environment system is embedded and embodied (Teques et al., in press). 357 
Similar reasoning can be applied to use of eye movements or verbal protocols as 358 
explanatory mechanisms in expert decision-making. Like neurophysiological processes, 359 
eye movements and concurrent verbalizations may be related to performance. But they 360 
also may not, although performance may still be maintained (e.g., high levels of 361 
performance achieved by Paralympic athletes such as blind or deaf-mute performers). A 362 
key point is that partial (neural or eye activity) or surrogate processes (verbalizations) 363 
are not different aspects of decision making in sport (Cotterill & Discolmbe, 2019); 364 
more importantly they are not the phenomenon of interest. The embeddedness of a 365 
performer within the performance environment during action is the phenomenon of 366 
interest. Why study the behaviour of the eye if what one really wants to study is the 367 
exploratory behaviours of a player or of a team? Why not move directly to the study of 368 
actions, and how it reveals the performer's exploration, problem solving or reasoning in 369 
a performance task? 370 
It is worth noting that  researchers can actually test hypotheses about action and 371 
cognition directly. Different kinds of activities and different kinds of information 372 
produce various cognitive functions. All of them have their basis in perceptually-guided 373 
actions. Investigators can modify ambient information in addition to modifying task 374 
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demands when they seek to study cognition. Since action is an expression of cognitive 375 
processes, it is possible to look at organizational and functional aspects of 376 
contextualized action in testing hypotheses about cognitions in behaviour (Araújo et al., 377 
2006, Correia et al., 2013).  378 
 379 
An ecological dynamics account of decision-making in sport 380 
   381 
Ecological dynamics can be traced to areas of science tangential to sport 382 
performance.  Two seminal researchers were instrumental in its origin: the ecological 383 
psychologist James J. Gibson (1966, 1979) and the physicist and biomechanist, Nikolai A. 384 
Bernstein (1967, 1996).  Turvey (1977) first highlighted the relevance of their work for 385 
understanding of perception and action, further elaborated by Kugler, Kelso and Turvey 386 
(e.g., 1980) by introducing the language of complex systems from physicists such as 387 
Prigogine (Prigogine & Nicolis, 1971), Haken (1977), and Iberall (1977). A 388 
comprehensive exposition of these ideas, and their implications for sport scientists, was 389 
provided by Davids and colleagues (Davids et al., 1994; Williams et al., 1992). 390 
Importantly, Davids et al.’s (1994) paper was influential for indicating the 391 
interdisciplinary relevance of their insights for the sport sciences (especially motor 392 
learning, biomechanics, sport psychology, sport pedagogy, performance analysis).  A 393 
further important impact in the sport sciences was made in developing an ecological 394 
dynamics rationale for decision-making byAraújo et al. (2006), where the link to 395 
Brunswik’s (1944, 1956) concept of representative design was firmly established. There 396 
are three important assumptions of the ecological dynamics approach, which are worth 397 
emphasizing in discussions of decision-making: i) behaviour emerges from the 398 
 17 
performer-environment system; ii) perception is of affordances (opportunities for 399 
action); and iii), action, therefore cognition, emerges under interacting constraints. 400 
 401 
Behaviour emerges from the performer-environment system 402 
Behaviour is defined at the ecological level of analysis: the level of interactions 403 
between an organism and its environment, both continuously shaping each other 404 
(Gibson, 1979; Richardson et al., 2008). A consequence of this idea is that behaviour can 405 
only be understood, not simply according to the characteristics of a performer, but 406 
symmetrically according to the characteristics of a performance environment. If sport 407 
psychologists seek to generalize behaviours from one context (e.g., experimental 408 
laboratory, training session) to another context (competition, a performance 409 
environment), there should be clear theoretical guidance on establishing behavioural 410 
correspondence between contexts. This guidance  is available in ecological psychology 411 
(e.g., Brunswik, 1956), where it has been demonstrated how athlete behavioural 412 
patterns are generated from the tight coordination emerging between a performer and 413 
a performance environment in the service of achieving  specific performance goal (e.g., 414 
coupling limb movements when climbing a vertical surface, Seifert t al., 2014; for a 415 
review, see Araújo & Davids, 2015).  416 
A tight performer-environment relationship seems to be a 'common-sense' view 417 
proposed in traditional sport psychology. However, a misconception is that the 418 
performer is typically regarded as the active agent, with the environment acting as a 419 
passive 'backdrop' that merely supports an individual's selection of actions, providing 420 
sources of stimuli to control behaviours (Araújo & Davids, 2011).  The separation of 421 
organism and environment leads to theorising in which the most significant explanatory 422 
factors in behaviour are located within the organism. The upshot is that causes for 423 
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behavioural disturbances are located in disturbances of brain function or in lack of 424 
sensitivity to 'cues to control' performance (e.g., O’Brien & Ahmed 2015; Wolpert & 425 
Landy, 2012; Yarrow et al., 2009).  In ecological dynamics, there is no internal 426 
knowledge structure or central pattern generator inside the organism responsible for 427 
controlling action. Rather, all parts of the system (brain, body, environment) are 428 
dynamically integrated during action regulation, just as both hands in the air are needed 429 
for the task of clapping. Contemporary research has clarified this misconception 430 
through the identification and analysis of eco-biophysical variables that capture the 431 
embedded relations between a performer and his/her environment (Araújo et al., 2006, 432 
Correia et al., 2013).  433 
 434 
Perception is of affordances 435 
In ecological psychology, environmental properties can directly inform an 436 
individual performer about what he/she can and cannot do in a performance 437 
environment (Gibson, 1966a, 1979; Michaels, 2000). For example, the rate of dilation of 438 
an image of an approaching object on an individual’s retina can provide time-to-439 
collision information without mental computations of distance or speed of an object to 440 
intercept it (Lee, Young, Reddish, Lough, & Clayton, 1983; Craig & Watson, 2011). By 441 
calibrating information of their own action capabilities, individuals directly perceive 442 
opportunities to act in the environment (i.e., affordances) (Gibson, 1979). The concept of 443 
affordances captures the fit between the constraints on each performer and the 444 
properties of the environment. Cognition emerges during such continuous interactions 445 
at the ecological scale of analysis, i.e., the performer-environment system (Turvey, 446 
1992), not from an internalised model of the world (the world is its own best model). 447 
Affordances, as possibilities for action in a particular performance setting, are what an 448 
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arrangement of surfaces, texture and objects offers to a performer. Whether a gap 449 
between two defenders, for example, is passable or not is not determined by its 450 
absolute size (whether measured in cms, metres or feet and inches), but how it relates 451 
to particularities of an individual performer, including size, speed and agility. The 452 
concept of affordance presupposes that the environment is directly perceived in terms 453 
of what actions a performer can achieve within a performance environment (i.e., it is not 454 
dependent on a perceiver’s expectations, Richardson et al., 2008). Affordances are 455 
dynamic, changing across continuous performer-environment interactions (Fajen et al., 456 
2009) and are not representational properties of mind.  Perceiving an affordance is to 457 
perceive how one can act in a particular set of performance conditions. Affordances 458 
capture the dynamics of the continuous interactions among individuals and their 459 
environment (Araújo & Davids, 2016).  460 
Performers can anticipate or prospectively control their actions by producing 461 
movements guided by information about future states of affairs in a performance 462 
environment (Beek et al., 2003; Montagne, 2005; Turvey & Shaw, 1995). Gibson (1966a, 463 
1979)termed this direct perception, or “knowledge of” the environment. This type of 464 
knowledge is not formulated in pictures, symbols or words, because it is the knowledge 465 
that makes the formulation of pictures and words possible. Knowledge of the 466 
environment obtained through direct perception is not subjective or private. 467 
Information is available in the environment, and many performers can detect it. On the 468 
other hand, Gibson conceived another type of knowledge: “images, pictures, and 469 
written-on surfaces afford a special kind of knowledge that I call mediated or indirect, 470 
knowledge at second hand” (Gibson, 1979, p. 42). This kind of knowledge, or indirect 471 
perception, is intrinsically shared, because it involves the displaying of information to 472 
others. In these cases the information on which direct perception can be based is 473 
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selectively adapted and modified in a display, for example as a schematic presentation 474 
of the co-positioning of players in two handball teams. They consolidate gains of 475 
perception by mediating knowledge through communication. The role of indirect forms 476 
of knowledge is to make others aware and to articulate shared knowledge (Reed, 1991). 477 
Thus, contradicting some unfortunate misinterpretations in sport psychology (e.g., 478 
Ripoll, 2009; Sutton & McIlwain, 2015; Williams & Ward, 2007), the ecological dynamics 479 
approach is deeply concerned with knowledge and considers cognition to play an 480 
important role in theoretical explanations of  human behaviour (Araújo et al., 2009a).  481 
A recurrent question to ecological psychologists is “what about consciousness?”. 482 
Scientists and philosophers have argued about the nature of consciousness, whether it 483 
exists or  can be verified, without reaching a consensus about the involvement of mind–484 
body dualism, physical reductionism, or epiphenomenalism (Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw, 485 
2007).   Specifically in psychology, Wilhelm Wundt and William James conceived 486 
consciousness without separating inner and outer experiences. Chalmers (1996) 487 
identified the 'easy' and  'hard' problems in defining consciousness. The solution to the 488 
easy problem involves discovering the alignment between behaviours and their 489 
neurological correlates. The ‘hard' problem implies moving beyond mere correlation to 490 
show how the nature of experience (behaviours) superimposes on the nature of 491 
physiological events. Merely correlating inner and outer events,  avoids questions of 492 
how experience arises and where its content comes from (Shaw & Kinsella-Shaw, 2007). 493 
Correlation between two data series says nothing about the nature of the items 494 
correlated. 495 
For Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw (2007) consciousness facilitates the detection and 496 
use of information. It can improve its integration, specification, interpretation, and 497 
generalization, as well as making movement control more flexible and coordinated over 498 
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a wider range of tasks. Consciousness contributes to the adaptive value of being aware 499 
of one's needs, preferences, and intentions with respect to actual or potential 500 
performance situations. However, the greater the ecological significance of what one 501 
needs to be aware of, the more likely it will be attended to. As Gibson put it: 502 
“Perceiving is an achievement of the individual, not an appearance in the 503 
theater of his consciousness. It is a keeping-in-touch with the world, an 504 
experiencing of things rather than a having of experiences. It involves 505 
awareness-of instead of just awareness. It may be awareness of something in 506 
the environment or something in the observer or both at once, but there is no 507 
content of awareness independent of that of which one is aware (Gibson, 1979, 508 
p.239).” 509 
With this understanding of perception, Gibson advanced the holistic view of 510 
consciousness of Wundt and James, by eliminating the need for solving the “easy-hard” 511 
problems of consciousness. Within this view these problems do not even arise: mental 512 
and material have equal status (Shaw & Kinsella-Shaw, 2007). Gibson followed James 513 
and Holt in rejecting the mind-matter dualism in that consciousness needs to be capable 514 
of physical characterization. For example, the experience of observing a goal scored 515 
when a football is curved through the air, implies a particular way of kicking the ball by 516 
a soccer player, in relation to a specific position related to the goal, and to the specific 517 
angle of the observer. These physical relations are needed for this experience to occur. 518 
Consciousness is a physical relation that only exists at the level of the individual-519 
environment system. If one subtracts such relations, only matter exists. Individuals can 520 
directly perceive their situation and themselves in that situation without needing a 521 
'consciousness copy' of it:  522 
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Grounded situational awareness emerges when the performer notices what 523 
surrounds her/him, what is changing, and what is emerging (Shaw, 2003). Importantly, 524 
to be aware of an affordance is not to have some kind of belief about the world (e.g., 525 
beliefs about cause and effect; Reed, 1996). Informed awareness is not just information 526 
about the environment, but of information about oneself in relation to that surrounding 527 
environment as well (Shaw & Kinsella-Shaw, 2007). 528 
Recently, Seifert, Cordier and colleagues (2017), in a study about decision-529 
making in climbing, showed that, during previewing, climbers do not necessarily make 530 
plans based on mental representations for programming their actions. Rather previews 531 
help them become aware of functional properties of the environment. They perceive 532 
opportunities for action rather than neutral physical properties (metrics such as 533 
distance (in cms or inches) to reach a hold). By capturing gaze behaviours during route 534 
previewing, and  by relating those behaviours to actual climbing actions, Seifert and 535 
colleagues (2017) demonstrated that previewing allowed climbers to become 536 
perceptually attuned to affordances. Once acted upon they implied adjustments and 537 
revealed new information that, in turn, implied further adjustments and so on towards 538 
goal achievement (see Araújo, Dicks, & Davids. in press). Previewing (attuning to 539 
specific affordances)  can be considered a strategical behaviour (changing at a slower 540 
timescalewithout relying on mental representations and motor programing). The 541 
explorations, adjustments and choices actually made during the implementation of this 542 
strategy in climbing (faster changing) tactical behaviours. These continuous 543 
interactions in person-environment relations during performance do not require a role 544 
for non-observable concepts such as mental representations and motor programs.  545 
 546 
Action, therefore cognition, emerges under constraints 547 
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One consequence of the performer–environment system assumption is that 548 
behaviour can be understood as self-organized under constraints, in contrast to 549 
organization being imposed from inside (e.g., the mind) or outside (e.g., reinforcement 550 
contingencies, or the instructions of a coach). Performance is not prescribed by internal 551 
or external structures, yet within existing constraints, there are typically a limited 552 
number of stable solutions that can achieve specific desired outcomes (Araújo et al, 553 
2006). An athlete’s task is to exploit physical (e.g., rule-determined performance area 554 
characteristics) and informational (e.g., characteristics like surface features to be used 555 
in vertical ascent or distances to angles between co-positioning other players) 556 
constraints to stabilize performance behaviours. Constraints have the effect of reducing 557 
the number of configurations available to an athlete at any instance. In a performance 558 
environment, behaviour patterns emerge under constraints as less functional states of 559 
organization are dissipated. Athletes can exploit this tendency to enhance their 560 
adaptability and even to maintain performance stability under perturbations from the 561 
environment. Importantly, changes in performance constraints can lead a system 562 
towards bifurcation points where choices emerge as more specific information becomes 563 
available, constraining the environment-athlete system to switch to more functional 564 
paths of behaviour (such as performing a half volley on court in tennis, rather than a 565 
volley, as ball trajectory changes due to top spin on the ball). Measurement of the 566 
dynamics of eco-biophysical variables (e.g., the angle between an attacker-defender-567 
goal) enables understanding of how the cognitive functioning might be predicated on 568 
emergent, on-going performer-environment interactions in sport (Araújo et al., 2006; 569 
Correia et al, 2013). 570 
 571 
Choice of action modes while perceiving an affordance 572 
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When a performer changes from one action mode (walking towards a ball) to 573 
another (running after catching it), transitions among stable behavioural states (i.e., 574 
action modes) emerge from dynamic instabilities in the athlete-environment system. 575 
Transitioning provides a universal decision-making process for switching between 576 
distinct behavioural patterns (Kelso, 1995). Such stabilities and instabilities do not exist 577 
a priori in the (internalised) memorial structure of a performer, nor are pre-determined 578 
in the structure of the environment. Rather they are co-determined by the confluence of 579 
constraints and information, exemplifying how control lies in the emerging relations of 580 
the individual–environment system. This is a key point for sport psychologists to 581 
understand when they engage with athletes to help improve their decision-making 582 
behaviours. Emergent behavioural patterns have been formally modelled using 583 
differential equations and potential functions to describe the dynamical interactions of 584 
system components (e.g., Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Scholz, Kelso, & Schöner, 1987). 585 
The landscape changes as attractors disappear or emerge. Athletes can exploit system 586 
multi-stability, transiting between different action modes.  587 
Araújo and colleagues (e.g., Araújo et al., 2006; Davids & Araújo, 2010) have 588 
previously explained that decision-making behaviours during performance emerge in 589 
such a landscape of attractors (stable system states), as potential task solutions. In 590 
contrast to the traditional view of arriving at a putative 'single best solution', athletes 591 
modulate their interactions with the environment until the performer-environment 592 
system arrives at a stable, functional solution. A viable option selected is the strongest 593 
attractor for an individual-environment system at any given moment, with other 594 
options having less strength of attraction. Decision-making is explained through an 595 
integration of intentions, actions and perceptions, since selected behaviours are the 596 
realization of affordances. This selection only emerges from the continuous interactions 597 
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of an individual and a performance environment. Ignoring other options is a 598 
consequence of the dynamical (athlete-environment) system relaxing to one stable state, 599 
concomitantly ignoring remaining options (attractors). The presence of a stronger 600 
attractor does not eliminate the influence of other attractors in the dynamic landscape 601 
of action possibilities (e.g., Araújo et al. 2014). Under dynamic performance conditions, 602 
other attractors (i.e., as options) may emerge and exert their attraction. Dynamical 603 
models can explain different decisions through the same underlying process of 604 
originating and decaying attractors. A model initially proposed by Tuller, and colleagues 605 
(Tuller et al., 1994), for judging between pronounced words accounted for decision-606 
making behaviours in other tasks such as the walk-run transition (Diedrich & Warren, 607 
1998), or the decision to start from right or left positions in a sailing regatta (Araújo et 608 
al., 2015). In the model of Tuller et al. (1994), it is assumed that the system’s state 609 
changes over time influenced by the dynamics of the attractor landscape. In the study of 610 
Araújo et al. (2015), the system’s state was the decision, expressed by ecological 611 
constraints such as the sailors' place on the starting line and the angle between the 612 
wind direction and the starting line. In agreement with predictions of Tuller et al.’s 613 
(1994) model, Araújo et al. (2006, 2015) observed properties such as qualitative 614 
changes, abrupt jumps, critical fluctuations and multi-stability. In the crucial pre-start 615 
period, there was no single “valid” course for each boat to follow, so the boats engaged 616 
in an intensive pre-start competition, with each continuously trying to gain a positional 617 
advantage over opponents. Analysis of the pre-start period revealed that, although 618 
decisions regarding the discrete 'most favourable starting place' could be made in 619 
advance, this tactic was inherently misleading.  There is a need to consider and interact 620 
with instantaneously changing task (e.g., movements of opposing boats) and 621 
environmental constraints (e.g., ocean currents) (Araújo et al., 2005, Pluijms et al., 622 
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2013). This particular process of decision-making (the selection of a path to an 623 
advantageous starting point) clearly cannot be based on mental comparisons between 624 
optimal and actual states mentally represented, because they emerge under the 625 
interaction of emerging constraints including an adversary’s actions, wind changes, 626 
ocean currents, and boat manoeuvring skills. Due to high computation loads required, 627 
this level of action programming would be highly infeasible, perhaps needless.  It would 628 
be impossible to precisely calculate the exact relational state of each source of 629 
constraint such as opponent manoeuvres, winds, tides and currents, and personal/boat 630 
movements, and predict their changes, and plan how to act accordingly, on a 631 
momentary basis (see also Araújo et al., 2014 for a model in decision-making in Rugby 632 
Union). 633 
Rather, action modes are chosen when affordances are selected, but they can 634 
change, guided by appearance and disappearance of affordances in the performance 635 
landscape. As Turvey and Shaw put it ‘‘to see the distance-to-contact is to see the work 636 
required, to see the time-to-contact is to see the impulse forces required, to see the 637 
direction to-contact is to see the torques required’’ (Turvey & Shaw, 1995, p. 158).  638 
During performance, an athlete’s actions generate perceptual information, which, in 639 
turn, constrains the emergence of further movements. For example, in ice climbing, 640 
Seifert and colleagues (2014) observed how skilled climbers perceived different 641 
properties of ice surface structures to adapt their inter-limb coordination patterns with 642 
ice tools and crampons. When they detected holes in the ice surface left by previous 643 
climbers, hooking actions emerged. Conversely, when the ice was smooth and dense, 644 
climbers used swinging actions to create holes needed for a safe and rapid traversal. In 645 
turn, a climber’s movements continuously change his/her relationship with the ice 646 
surface. Decision-making in this climbing task is facilitated by multi-stability of the 647 
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perception-action system. Multistability refers to the principle of “functional 648 
equivalence” (Kelso, 2012, p.907), also known as "degeneracy" (Edelman & Gally, 2001). 649 
Degeneracy corresponds to “the ability of elements that are structurally different to 650 
perform the same function or yield the same output” (Edelman and Gally, 2001, p. 651 
13763). It signifies that an individual can vary action-perception without compromising 652 
function (Mason, 2010; Price & Friston, 2002), as an expression of the adaptive and 653 
functional role of coordination pattern variability in order to satisfy interacting 654 
constraints (Seifert et al., 2016b). A higher level of skill reflects greater adaptive 655 
capacity to achieve similar performance outcomes with different movements and 656 
coordination patterns, rather than relying on a single (programmed, represented) 657 
ready-made solution. The presence of degeneracy in sport actions increases an athlete's 658 
complexity and robustness against perturbations and ensures a functional ongoing 659 
engagement (decision-making) with a dynamic environment.  660 
 661 
Selecting an affordance in a world full of affordances  662 
Behaviours can be sustained by simultaneous and successive affordances, and 663 
not necessarily by a hierarchical plan or representation capturing a sequence of 664 
performance operations (Araújo, Dicks, Davids, in press). Reed (1993) argued that these 665 
patterns of behavioral organization emerge in situations in which different affordances 666 
can be utilized to enhance performance in contexts like sport. This performer-667 
environment basis of conceptualizing behaviour indicates that affordances can be used, 668 
motivating an organism to act, but they are not to be viewed as unique causes for 669 
behaviour because a person may not act on a perceived affordance. Affordances favour 670 
certain behaviours and select against others (Withagen et al., 2012). The factors 671 
underlying the tendency for favoured behaviours to be realized are multiple. For 672 
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example, in climbing, a rock surface may be traversable for an individual climber in a 673 
specific way, depending on the availability and spatial organization of surface texture 674 
properties (holes shape, size and orientation, offering more or less stability) (Seifert et 675 
al 2015). Indeed, each surface property has many affordances, and it is from this 676 
selection of which affordance to act upon that it is possible to understand behavioural 677 
dynamics in different climbers. Whether the individual takes up these possibilities or 678 
not is a separate matter since affordances are not deterministic causes, i.e., one can 679 
decline or accept an invitation to act in a specific way (Withagen et al. 2012, 2017). 680 
Since affordances do not select themselves, the intention to use an affordance, as Reed 681 
(1993) put it, like other biological phenomena, emerges out of a process of variation and 682 
selection. In this way, people are 'drawn into' interactions with affordances offered by a 683 
performance environment (Withagen et al., 2017).  684 
Relatedly, Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) defined skilled intentionality as “the 685 
individual’s selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances” 686 
(p.701). This notion indicates that the everyday environment offers a range of more or 687 
less inviting affordances (Withagen et al. 2012). However, these affordances are 688 
relational: accessible to individuals with necessary skills (e.g., developed through 689 
previous experiences) to act on them. For example, where one tennis player with an 690 
excellent backhand shot may perceive an opportunity to force cross-court shots when 691 
using it, another player who is highly-skilled at volleying may perceive every ball as an 692 
opportunity to approach the net. Thus, sports people interact with a surrounding 693 
environment through skilled engagement with the concrete affordances that a specific 694 
environment offers them. because of their unique skill set. From this viewpoint 695 
perceptual attunement developed through experience brings an 'openness' to 696 
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affordances that, without skill, would not be accessible, since it is skill that opens up 697 
possibilities for action to an individual. 698 
Moreover, individuals act relative to multiple relevant affordances 699 
simultaneously, or to what Rietveld and colleagues (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2015; van 700 
Dijk & Rietveld, 2017) call a “field of affordances”, each of which is of greater or lesser 701 
significance to the performer. For example, the field of affordances of significance for a 702 
goalkeeper in hockey or football only marginally overlaps with the field of affordances 703 
for an attacking player in these invasion games. This idea justifies why an individual is 704 
open to and ready to act on multiple affordances at the same time,, which needs to 705 
underpin practice design in sport. Through experience, training and practice, 706 
individuals can display tendencies towards a specific link with the environment in a 707 
field of affordances. Additionally, the existence of constellations of constraints, 708 
maximizing the availability of affordances, has been identified in different sports 709 
settings (e.g., Barsingerhorn et al.2013; Pepping et al, 2011; Hristovski et al, 2006, Paulo 710 
et al, 2016). These regions of 'hyper-link’ in a field of affordances may be important in 711 
sensitizing performers to subtle differences in an opponent's actions, and thus in the 712 
process of calibration to a perceived affordance.  In learning design, the perception of a 713 
new affordance in a landscape of temporally nested affordances (Hristovski et al., 2011; 714 
Torrents et al, 2015) can bring about higher adaptive capacities of performers.  715 
We recently suggested that one important way to explain how affordances are 716 
selected is based on information for the next affordance (Araújo, Dicks & Davids, in 717 
press). This is the informational basis for the selection of affordances in multi-scale 718 
dynamics (Keijzer, 2001). This means that affordances are conditionally-coupled (van 719 
Geert 1994), allowing a dynamic assembly of overall behavioural sequences. In tennis, 720 
Carvalho and colleagues (2014) studied how sequential behaviours, expressed as 721 
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successive strokes in a  rally, was based on conditionally-coupled affordances. The goal-722 
directed displacement index, was developed as a measure to simultaneously consider the 723 
distance of competing players in relation to two on-court reference points –the central 724 
line of the court and the net- during competitive performance. This eco-biophysical 725 
variable reflects the state of the individual-environment system. This study showed that 726 
different functional relations could be established between skilled players attuned, 727 
open, and responsive to match affordances. A player with an advantage is perceiving 728 
and creating affordances for the other (see Fajen, et al, 2009), where the other is invited 729 
(pressured) to act upon such affordances, since he/she is open and responsive to play in 730 
the rally.  The stability of the interactions between players is highly constrained by the 731 
co-adaptations (co-positioning) of the players (near or away from the central line of the 732 
court, or from the net) and the pattern of interactions developed during play (cross-733 
court or down-the-line rallies). In such a field of affordances, a player with an advantage 734 
tries to create a successively more unstable situation for the other player, stroke after 735 
stoke, in an effort to de-stabilize the existing spatial-temporal coordination between 736 
them.  The advantage in a rally is a process that is developed though successive actions, 737 
where nested affordances are dynamically assembled and imply perceptual attunement 738 
of skilled players to information for the next affordance. 739 
 740 
Conclusion 741 
In sport, coordination of whole body actions emerges with events, objects and 742 
surfaces and other athletes in the environment, is a requisite of performance. In other 743 
social-cultural activities, such as chess or playing piano, expert action tends to reside in 744 
micro-movements. A generalized interest of the scientific community on the topic of 745 
action has been around for no more than two decades (Herwig et al., 2013). However, 746 
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sport performance is not typically predicated on performance of micro- or simple 747 
movements. It is a phenomenon that capitalises on  detailed interactions between an 748 
individual and a performance environment. This is why the structure of action, during 749 
ongoing interactions of a performer in a performance environment, is a key issue for 750 
understanding expert cognition in sport. 751 
From this viewpoint, the study of decision-making in sport involves selecting 752 
among affordances. However, once an affordance is perceived, its selection embodies an 753 
action mode, i.e., the action mode is chosen in the perception of an affordance. 754 
Interestingly, this action mode can change to other action modes guided by the 755 
information conveyed by the affordance (e.g., from walking to running when fielding in 756 
cricket or baseball if a ball's trajectory is perceived as falling to ground earlier). A few 757 
models of decision making already exist in ecological dynamics (e.g., Araújo et al., 2014; 758 
2015). But there are many other courses of action, competition sub-phases and sports 759 
to address. Moreover, action modes bring about new affordances among which new 760 
selections may emerge. Therefore, the two instances of decision-making are intimately 761 
connected and future research is needed to investigate this relationship.   762 
 Ecological dynamics is focused in the performer-environment system as an 763 
explanatory level of analysis, not on inferred internal variables. Ecological dynamics 764 
research is needed to understand how environmental manipulations (e.g., match status 765 
in competition, effects of differences in heights between a competing attacker and 766 
defender or the influence on performance of variations in holds designed into a 767 
climbing wall) influence the behavioral dynamics of the participants (Cordovil et al., 768 
2009).  769 
  770 
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The understanding of action, and therefore cognition, as an emergent process 771 
under individual, environmental and task constraints has consequences for how 772 
decision-making behaviour is understood and enhanced by experience and training 773 
(Araújo et al., 2009b) by sport psychologists and sport practitioners. Also, such an 774 
approach has consequences for understanding of cognition and agency (Withagen et al., 775 
2017), and creativity (Hristovski et al. 2011), in general psychology, as well as 776 
performance analysis in sport (Passos et al., 2017), sport pedagogy (Chow et al., 2015; 777 
Renshaw et al., 2015), team sport expertise (Araújo, Silva & Davids, 2015) and talent 778 
development (Araújo et al., 2010; Davids et al., 2017). Indeed, sport psychology is 779 
located in an exciting position, to reveal how action is not a ready-made implementation 780 
selected 'off the shelf', but a true choice behaviour emerging from a range of 781 
opportunities. 782 
 783 
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